Introduction
States across East Asia are competing to build and exercise soft power using public diplomacy. Many are making efforts to build soft power assets ranging from musical arts to historical figures and cultural values. They have invested in public diplomacy by fortifying public diplomacy offices within government ministries, establishing culture centers abroad, disseminating their own values and national goals, leveraging cuisine, and expanding academic and educational exchanges. All of these actions aim to inf luence foreign public opinion in order to garner support for states' own foreign policy objectives.
One important area in which states in East Asia use soft power is projecting their regional vision. A dramatic increase of intra-East Asian connectedness in trade, investment, and finance has led national leaders to realize that East Asia is becoming a great whole of which they are part, and that their fate is closely tied to the prosperity of the region. Since the 2008 global financial crisis occurred, these trends have been resilient and have even accelerated: the East Asian economies collectively have grown faster than other regions, while intraregional economic interdependence among the partners has been less interrupted and has quickly rebounded from the crisis.
2 This, in turn, has led to a continued search for regionalism, by which states foster deeper connections with each other. We have seen an increasing intensity of public diplomacy activism among regional actors that convey the visions, ideas, and frameworks that chart the peaceful and prosperous future of East Asia as a collective whole to the foreign public. In order to take the initiative in regional cooperation, each state has competitively proposed a regional architecture that would best position itself in the regional leadership stakes.
3 To name a few, the East Asian Economic Caucus, the East Asian Community, the Northeast Asian Community, and the AsiaPacific Community all have different origins and, in essence, illustrate a battle for ideas that started from the Chinese-Japanese rivalry. By the early 2000s when China took the initiative in connecting neighbors into an economic network, Japan was quick to notice and reacted by hailing its own version of an "East Asian Community." Sensitive to changes in East Asian regionalism, in which Japanese initiative has receded, the United States responded to the surge in public diplomacy from China. The so-called US "pivot" toward Asia seems a politicalmilitary reaction to Chinese inf luence, but it can equally be seen as a response in the form of "soft balancing."
This chapter explores the competitive nature of regional leadership dynamics, in which key actors attempt to reposition themselves by utilizing public diplomacy. First, it provides an empirical account of regionalization and competitive regionalism among major states. The rapid pace of economic interconnectedness in the region accompanies interdependence asymmetry among national economies, which in turn has led to strategic concerns among states. States engage in competition by pleading for a regional vision that strategically locates their own place in the region. In particular, middle powers, which are relatively deficient in hard power resources, deal with their increased vulnerability from superpower rivalry by investing more in other sources of leadership via public diplomacy, and make efforts to engage in the difficult process of relocating themselves in the dynamics of competitive regionalism.
Parallel to this trend is the public diplomacy struggle to undercut others' soft power. This is in contrast to conventional wisdom, which contends that soft power competition will have a benign inf luence on regional order. Joseph Nye argues that soft power competition can be a win-win game because all countries can gain from finding each other attractive. As Yoshihide Soeya's chapter in this volume indicates, historical issues have changed the nature of public diplomacy among
